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This study examines the impact of Poland’s trade liberalization in 1994-2001 on the industry 
wage structure. The liberalization was undertaken in preparation for Poland’s accession to the 
European Union and was more pronounced in industries with larger shares of unskilled labor.   
Our analysis indicates that a decrease in an industry tariff was associated with higher wages 
being earned by workers employed in the industry, controlling for worker characteristics and 
geographic variables. The result is robust to including year and industry fixed effects, controlling 
for industry-level exports, imports, concentration, stock of foreign direct investment and capital 
accumulation. The finding is consistent with liberalization increasing competitive pressures, 
forcing firms to restructure and improve their productivity, which in turn translates into higher 
profits being shared with workers.  It could also be potentially attributed to trade liberalization 
lowering the costs of imported inputs, which enhances firm profitability. The result holds when 
skilled workers are excluded from the sample, thus suggesting that reductions in trade barriers 
benefited the unskilled in terms of an increase in wages.   
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Rapid trade liberalizations undertaken by many developing and transition countries 
during the past decade have inspired heated public discussions.  Proponents of trade 
liberalization posit that for developing countries, many of which are small economies with 
abundant labor, opening would lead to rising wages.  They point to the substantial increases in 
average real wages taking place in open economies in the developing world over the last several 
decades as evidence that trade does indeed increase demand for the abundant factor – labor in 
this case – much like trade theory would predict.  Opponents of trade liberalization, on the other 
hand, speak about the uneven distribution of gains from openness to trade and resulting increases 
in wage inequality.  They also claim that liberalization will lead to a “race to the bottom” in 
wages, and as a consequence, to impoverishment of workers. 
There exists little conclusive evidence about the effects of trade liberalization on wages.  
One shortcoming of the early literature has been the use of average industry wage data, which 
are assumed to be independent of characteristics of workers in the industry, and the focus on 
outcomes (e.g., exports, imports, prices) instead of policy measures (e.g., tariffs).  Only recently 
researchers have begun to utilize policy variables, such as tariffs, to examine the impact of 
liberalization on industry wage premiums which measure the portion of wages that cannot be 
explained by a worker’s or a firm’s characteristics but can be explained by a worker’s industry 
affiliation.  However, the conclusions of such studies have been mixed.  On the one hand, 
Revenga (1997) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) provide evidence suggesting that trade 
liberalization erodes wages of workers in previously protected sectors.  On the other hand, 
Pavcnik et al. (2004) find no significant relationship between liberalization and industry wage 
premium and Gaston and Trefler (1994) show that liberalization is associated with a higher 
industry wage premium. 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between trade liberalization and wages to 
understand the channel through which trade liberalization affects the wage structure and, 
indirectly, the linkage between trade and poverty.  Unlike the existing studies, which are based 
on the U.S. or Latin American data, this paper focuses on Poland, a Central European country 
undergoing transition from planned to market economy.  Factor endowments in Poland differ 
from those in the countries previously examined.  The share of population aged 15-75 with 
college education at 9.2 percent in 1999 is lower than that in the United States, yet unlike many   3
Latin American countries Poland attained universal literacy among the population due to its 
socialist legacy. 
We are interested in the impact of trade liberalization on wages because it has important 
implications for income inequality and poverty.  Industries differ in the composition of 
workforce with some having a higher proportion of skilled labor than others.  If trade 
liberalization erodes wages, and if tariff reduction is greater in sectors with a disproportionate 
percentage of unskilled labor, as was the case in Poland, then the unskilled could experience a 
greater decline in earnings.  As in other countries, educational attainment is a powerful predictor 
of poverty status in Poland.  For instance, while fewer than 0.6 percent of households headed by 
a person with college education were subject to hard poverty in 2001, the same was true of 12 
percent of households headed by an individual with a secondary vocational degree and 18 
percent of households whose head had only primary education. As evident from Table 1, the 
figures for medium poverty were equally striking.  Moreover, this pattern persisted throughout 
the whole period of our study 1994-2001 (Topinska and Kuhl, 2003). 
The effect of trade liberalization on income distribution and poverty is likely to be larger 
in Poland than in other countries due to the rigidity of the Polish labor market and the slow 
change in the regional distribution of economic activities (see Table A1 in Appendix I).  Thus, 
even a moderate change in wages across industries is likely to exacerbate the existing regional 
disparities in incomes and poverty incidence illustrated in Figure 1.   
The rigidity of Poland’s labor regulations is an advantage in our analysis: with the limited 
labor mobility across sectors in the short and medium term, a worker’s industry affiliation is the 
immediate channel through which the effects of trade liberalization will be felt.  As illustrated in 
Figure 2, employers in Poland are more restricted in their hiring and firing decisions relative to 
their counterparts in the United Kingdom, Turkey, Russia, Brazil, Colombia or Mexico, just to 
name a few.  Figure 2 presents the index of hiring and firing flexibility compiled by the Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR), published jointly by the Geneva-based World Economic Forum 
and the Center for International Development at Harvard University in 1996.  It is a country 
specific measure that quantifies the average response to the survey question: “Is hiring and firing 
of workers flexible enough?” It takes on the value of 6 for a very flexible labor market and 1 in 
the case of the most rigid ones.  Since it is based on the views of “business practitioners” in each 
country, it captures not only laws on the books but also their enforcement.  According to this   4
index, Singapore and Hong Kong had the most flexible labor markets while Poland ranked 25th 
out of 49 countries.  While for Singapore and Hong Kong the index value was above 5; the 
United Kingdom, Brazil, the Czech Republic, and Russia (among other countries) had an index 
above 4; the index for Poland was equal to 3.6.  A similar picture emerges from Figure 3, which 
presents the Index on the Flexibility of Individual Dismissal compiled by Djankov et al. (2001).
1  
Unlike the GCR Index in the previous figure, this index is based on the existing regulations 
rather than their enforcement.  In addition to rigid labor markets, which hinder worker 
reallocation across sectors, labor mobility across regions is limited in Poland due to housing 
shortage and prohibitive rent costs (for evidence see Deichmann and Henderson, 2004, Przybyla 
and Rutkowski, 2004). 
The second advantage of choosing Poland as the subject of our analysis is the fact that the 
changes in its tariffs can be treated as exogenous, as they were stipulated by the Association 
Agreement between the European Community and Poland signed in 1991.  This agreement 
predetermined the schedule of tariff reductions that took place during the period of interest, 
1994-2001.  Moreover, as the goal of the agreement was free movement of goods between the 
two entities and Poland’s accession to what is now called the European Union, all tariffs on 
manufactured products (with the exception of processed food) were brought down to zero by 
2001.  Poland’s trade liberalization was rapid and encompassed a drastic reduction in tariffs from 
over 20 percent in leather manufacturing; and over 15 percent in wood; non-metallic; rubber and 
plastic products in 1991 to zero within a decade.  
We investigate the relationship between trade liberalization and wages in an expanded 
Mincerian wage equation.  We pool together information from Labor Force Surveys conducted 
during the 1994-2001 period into one regression.  Controlling for worker-, firm-, sector- and 
location-specific characteristics as well as year and industry fixed effects, we expand the wage 
equation to include tariff variables.  The analysis covers 14 manufacturing sectors, including 
electricity production. Given the nature of the specification used, our attention is restricted to 
employed individuals, and thus we do not consider the implications of trade liberalization for 
unemployment. 
We find that workers in industries with lower tariffs tend to have higher wages.  This 
result is robust to including year and industry fixed effects, industry exports, imports, 
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concentration and capital accumulation, in addition to controlling for detailed worker 
characteristics.  The result is consistent with a reduction in tariff leading to increased competitive 
pressures in the liberalizing industry which forces companies to restructure and improve their 
productivity, which in turn results in the gains being shared with employees.  This interpretation 
is in line with the findings of many studies that established a positive association between trade 
liberalization and productivity.
2  To further support this interpretation we employ firm level data 
for the period 1996-2000 to demonstrate that trade liberalization indeed resulted in the increased 
productivity in liberalizing sectors.  The robust and significant relationship between a reduction 
in tariff and an increase in wages is also consistent with the stylized fact that there is much 
inefficiency in a planned economy; a sector that is exposed to greater foreign competition during 
the transition becomes more efficient and productive.  Another possible explanation for the 
finding is that trade liberalization makes imported inputs cheaper, which enhances profitability 
of the firms relying on such inputs.  The findings of Fernandes (2003) appear to support this 
hypothesis but because of the aggregated nature of our industry classification, we are not able to 
investigate this hypothesis in-depth.  
Further, our findings do not suggest any erosion of wages of the unskilled (i.e., “race to 
the bottom” in wages) from trade liberalization as they hold when we exclude skilled workers 
from the sample. Moreover, our data indicate that industries with a greater reduction in tariffs are 
also those with higher proportions of the unskilled.     
This study is organized as follows.  The next section presents some facts on Poland’s 
trade liberalization.  It is followed by a description of the empirical strategy and the data 
employed in the analysis.  Then we present the estimation results.  The last section concludes. 
 
 
Trade Liberalization in Poland 
 
In September 1989 Poland’s first non-communist government since the end of World II 
assumed power, taking over the economy with a large budget deficit and triple-digit inflation.  
On January 1, 1990 the government implemented a bold reform program (“Balcerowicz plan”) 
aimed at stabilizing the economy, beginning the process of economic liberalization and 
privatization. During the initial period of transition (1990-91) Poland experienced a deep 
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for Chile and Fernandes (2003) for Colombia.   6
recession, followed by a strong recovery with the average annual growth rate of GDP equal to 
almost 5 percent during the 1992-2000 period. 
Transition to a market economy completely revolutionized Poland’s international trade.  
The country moved from a centrally-planned system of exports and imports conducted by state 
trading agencies under the arrangements of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to a 
free market where local producers suddenly become subject to the forces of competition.  In 
1991, trading under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance collapsed and in December of 
the same year Poland signed an Association Agreement with the European Community, which 
was a prelude to its future membership in the European Union (EU). In July of 1995 Poland 
joined the World Trade Organization.  Severe recessions in Poland’s traditional export markets 
coupled with lowering of tariffs in Western European countries resulted in massive reorientation 
of Polish international trade from East to West.   
The Association Agreement signed by Poland (and other Central and Eastern European 
countries) stipulated asymmetric phase-out of import tariffs with the goal of free trade in 
industrial goods by the end of 1999.  As a result, in 1999 the average Polish tariff on imports 
from the EU, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA) countries was brought down to 6.5 percent, as compared to the Most-
Favored-Nation (MFN) rate of 15.6 percent and the 34.6 percent rate applied to non-WTO 
members.   The rapid liberalization of trade in manufacturing products was not, however, 
accompanied by similar changes in agricultural goods.  While in 1999, the simple average 
applied MFN rate on manufacturing products was equal to 11.1 percent, the corresponding figure 
for agriculture was 34.2 percent.  The difference largely reflects the tariffication of variable 
levies agree by Poland during the Uruguay Round.  As Poland was a non-market economy for 
the base years of 1986-88, selected in the Uruguay Round for estimating tariff equivalents of 
non-tariff barriers prohibited on agricultural products, Poland applied the generally much higher 
EU tariff rates as the basis for tariffication, and thus considerably increased its protection of the 
agricultural sector (WTO 2000). 
Figure 4 shows the reduction in sectoral tariffs applied to imports from the European 
Union and from the world, respectively, between 1994 and 2001.  The largest reduction of 23 
percentage points was observed in leather and leather products, followed by a 15-percent-point 
or higher reductions in other non-metallic products; rubber and plastic products; wood and wood   7
products; and other manufacturing.  The smallest change was registered in tariffs on electricity 
and natural gas, which were low to begin with.  By 1999 all industrial products from the EU with 
the exception of food, beverage and tobacco products; motor vehicles; and petroleum and 
petroleum products were entering Poland duty free; however, imports from the world were still 
subject to positive tariffs.  As of 1999, about three-quarters of Poland’s exports and imports were 
conducted under preferential trading arrangements and thus subject to preferential tariffs.   
As detailed in Appendix II, the Association Agreement predetermined the speed and 
extent of trade liberalization which allows us to treat tariff changes as exogenous.  Since many 
agricultural products and processed foods, beverages and tobacco were excluded from the 
liberalization specified in the agreement and/or remained subject to quantitative restrictions, we 
will not include them in the analysis. 
 
 
Related Literature   
 
  The theoretical context for our analysis is provided by the specific factors model.  The 
model focuses on the short-run and assumes that factors of production are immobile across 
sectors.  Given the rigidities present in Poland’s labor market, this model constitutes a suitable 
basis for thinking about the relationship between trade and wages in the Polish context.  The 
model predicts a positive association between protection and industry wages.  Protection reduces 
imports and reduced imports increase labor demand, which in turn increases wages.  This 
mechanism raises wages in the protected industry relative to the economy-wide average wage.   
The second channel through which trade and protection affect wages is imperfectly 
competitive factor markets.  For example, unions may extract part of the rents from protection in 
the form of more jobs rather than higher wages.  Unionization is not a material issue in our 
analysis because the power of trade unions has been substantially weakened during the transition 
process.  Trade union density in Poland has dropped from 80 percent of the workforce in the 
1980s to 14 percent in 2002.  The highest trade union density was observed in mining (43.8 
percent), and non-tradable sectors such as transport (27.3 percent), and education (27.5 percent) 
(Boeri and Garibaldi, 2003).   
The third channel through which trade and protection affect wages is imperfectly 
competitive product markets.  Trade and protection affect the strategic interaction between firms   8
which in turn affects firm performance and wages.  For example, if trade protection promotes 
entry into an industry by enhancing the profitability of existing firms, and if new entrants face 
setup costs, then protection promotes inefficient entry and raises average production costs 
(Horstmann and Markusen, 1986).    
Another strand of literature particularly relevant to a transition economy, like Poland, 
which until 1990 was heavily protected and not subject to market forces and competition, is the 
literature on trade liberalization and productivity.  Inefficiencies and lower productivity 
associated with an increase in trade protection have been illustrated in the literature using the 
computable general equilibrium models (for example, Cox and Harris, 1985; Brown et al. 1992).  
There is also strong evidence from findings of firm-level studies that reduction in trade 
protection results in productivity improvement.  The competition effect from imports has been 
documented by many empirical studies (Roberts and Tybout, 1997).  For instance, Pavcnik 
(2002) finds that the productivity of plants in the import-competing sectors grew 3-10 percent 
more than in the non-traded goods sector during trade liberalization in Chile, suggesting that 
exposure to international competition forces previously shielded plants to improve their 
performance.  Fernandes (2003) demonstrates that trade liberalization in Colombia has increased 
plant-level productivity, primarily through gains in within-plant productivity.  Other studies 
reaching similar conclusions include Harrison (1994) for Cote d’Ivoire, Krishna and Mitra 
(1998) for India, Kim (2000) for Korea, and Hay (2001) for Brazil.   
 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Labor Force Survey (LFS) 
 
The analysis is based on the data collected through the Polish Labor Force Survey (LFS).  
The survey has been conducted four times each year since the fall of 1992, and we have access to 
selected quarters of the surveys during the period 1992-2001.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
employ all 11 years in the analysis as the 1992 and 1993 surveys were based on a different 
industry classification. Thus, our analysis covers the period of 1994 through 2001.  We use the 
second quarter of years 1993 through 2001, except in years 1999 and 2001, for which only 
information for the first quarter was available.     9
The survey sample is representative of the country’s population.  Sampling for the LFS 
follows the two-stage household sampling.  First, the stratification is based on voivodships 
(administrative districts) and primary sampling units are sampled from each strata with 
diversified sampling probability, proportional to the number of households in a primary sampling 
unit.  Second, a determined number of households are selected randomly from each primary 
sampling unit, depending on the size of primary sampling units.  For example, 8 households are 
sampled from primary sampling units from rural municipalities, and 5 households are sampled 
from primary sampling units from large cities.   
Between 1993 and 1998, the sample was interviewed only in the middle month of the 
quarter whereas since 1999, a uniform number of randomly selected households was interviewed 
in every week of the 13 weeks throughout the quarter.   In each quarter about 24,000 households 
were interviewed, amounting to about 40,000 individuals sampled.  Members of households 
above aged 15 were asked questions on their employment status, type of employers, sector of 
employment, monthly earnings, weekly hours worked, and personal characteristics.  
Unfortunately, wage information on self-employed is not available as questions about earnings 
were not asked to the self-employed.  Employees make up about 70 percent of the sample in the 
survey, and self-employed, another 25 percent, and the remaining 5 percent are unpaid family 
workers. Employment sectors are classified according to a variant of the European NACE 





We investigate the relationship between trade liberalization and wages by estimating a 
reduced form model with the logarithm of real hourly wages being the dependent variable.  The 
real hourly wage is calculated by deflating the reported monthly wage to 1992 zlotys using the 
Consumer Price Index from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and dividing it by the 
number of hours worked in the reporting week multiplied by the number of weeks (4.2). Our 
sample is restricted to individuals of ages 15-75 inclusive, employed in the manufacturing and 
electricity sectors. We estimate the following wage equation (1) by pooling all workers from the 
1994-2001 Labor Force Surveys 
(1)   it t j jt it it tariff X w ε δ λ δ β α + + + + + = ln    10
where ln wit is the log of real wages of worker i employed in industry j and observed in the LFS 
in year t.  Note that the data set is not a true panel but consists of repeated cross-sections. Xit is 
the vector of worker characteristics that include age, age squared, marital status, gender, a 
dummy for the educational attainment category, a dummy for the occupation category, a dummy 
for employment in the private sector, a dummy for the geographic region (voivoidship) and a 
dummy for the size of the city where the worker lives. Tariffjt represents the average tariff 
applied to imports of industry j’s products in year t. λj denotes the fixed effect for the worker’s 
industry affiliation, and δt is the year fixed effect. Year fixed effects are included to absorb 
economy wide shocks that may affect wages while industry dummies control for sector-specific 
effects, such as for instance, prevalence of labor unions. The standard errors are clustered on 
industry-year combinations to adjust for the fact that while our variable of interest (tariff) is at 
the industry level, the regression is performed at the micro level (see Moulton 1990). 
Tariffjt is defined as the simple average of tariffs on products of industry j imported at 
time t.  We use tariffs vis-à-vis the European Union as well as tariffs pertaining to imports from 
the world. We experiment with trade-weighted average tariffs and the results are similar to those 
for the simple averages, therefore we report only the latter. The tariff data come from the World 
Bank’s WITS database. 
We estimate the effects of tariff changes on workers’ wages while controlling for the 
individual worker’s characteristics as well as for other potential influences (e.g., geographic and 
sectoral variables).  Later, we also allow returns to schooling to vary by years.  To eliminate a 
potential omitted variable bias, we also include such controls as the Herfindahl Index, measuring 
concentration in the industry, capital accumulation in the industry, stock of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the sector, sectoral imports and exports. We use lagged values to avoid 
potential simultaneity bias. The Herfindahl index pertains to four largest firms in the sector and 
is calculated based on firm level data from the Amadeus database covering the period 1994-2001.  
The information on capital accumulation comes from various issues of the Polish Statistical 
Yearbook.  The FDI figures are from the Foreign Trade Research Institute (various issues). Trade 
data come from the UN COMTRADE database. 
 
   11
Descriptive Statistics 
  
  Before proceeding to the empirical results, we briefly discuss the summary statistics.  As 
presented in Table 2, the average age of workers in our sample was 56 in 1994 and increased 
steadily to 59 years in 2000.  However, there was a sharp drop in 2001, with the average age 
equal to only 39 years.  Average hours of work remained quite steady at about 41 hours 
throughout the period, with the exception of 2001 when a decline to 39 was registered.   About 
three-quarters of workers in our sample were married, and females constituted less than half (45-
47 percent) of the sample throughout the period.   In 1994, only 24 percent of workers were 
employed in the private sector, but by 2001 this figure increased to 49 percent. Throughout the 
second half of the 1990s, almost all employed (97 percent) considered their jobs permanent, but 
in 2001 this figure dropped to 88 percent.  The real average hourly wage increased by about 50 
percent between 1994 and 2001.   
The educational attainments have increased during the period considered.  The proportion 
of workers with primary school education or less fell from 13.7 percent to 10.5 percent.  The 
shares of workers with general secondary education or vocational education have remained 
constant at 7 percent and 35 percent, respectively.  The percentage of workers with tertiary 
education rose—the share of those with university degrees increased from 12 to 15 percent.  
  Table 3 presents the distribution of labor across industries in each year during the 1994-
2001 period.  The figures reflect structural changes taking place in the economy during this 
period, namely a fall in the agricultural and mining employment and a rise of services sectors 
which until 1990 had been underdeveloped.  As for the latter, a particularly strong expansion was 
observed in wholesale and retail trade (43 percent growth), hotel services (71 percent growth); 
financial, banking and real estate services (at 43 percent).  Employment in manufacturing 
industries remained relatively stable with the exception of plastic and rubber products which 
registered a 89 percent growth whereas machinery has contracted, halving its share.    
  The changes in the economic structure have also affected the role of unions in the Polish 
economy.  Mining and machinery sectors used to be industries with strong union presence, but 
the large fall in employment in these industries contributed to erosion of unions in Poland, as 
was the case in many other European countries where sectors with highest number of union 
members had contracted (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2003).  Unionization has also become weaker 
because of privatization and the increase in the number of smaller enterprises.  Historically, 100   12
percent of large state-owned enterprises (250+ employees), and 75 percent of medium-sized 
state-owned enterprises (50-250 employees) had two or more unions. After being privatized, 
however, only 5 percent of large private companies had unions. Moreover, unions are totally 
absent in newly created small private companies (Gardawski et al., 1998). Thus, unionization is 
not a significant force in Poland during the period of our analysis.   
  Within each industry, we observe changes in the composition of labor force.  As 
illustrated in Table 4, which presents the share of unskilled workers in each industry, with the 
exception of the paper and pulp manufacturing and social and communal services sector where 
there have been increases in the shares of unskilled workers, the other industries registered 
declines of different magnitudes. Sectors such as construction, agriculture, wood product 
manufacturing and textile manufacturing experienced a limited fall (3-5 percent) in the shares of 
unskilled workers, whereas industries such as banking and financial services; rubber and plastic 
product manufacturing observed larger declines (44 percent, and 57 percent, respectively) over 
time. 
  As evident from Figure 5, sectors with a higher proportion of unskilled workers 
experienced a larger reduction in import tariffs between 1994 and 2001.  The correlation between 
the unskilled labor share and the change in tariff is –0.644.   The sector with the largest decrease 
(23 percentage points) in the average tariff vis-à-vis the European Union is the leather 
manufacturing in which the shares of unskilled labor were 22 percent and 17 percent in 1994 and 
2001, respectively.  In contrast, machinery and equipment industry had the smallest decrease (8 
percent) in tariff and the shares of unskilled labor were 11 percent and 5 percent in 1994 and 





Table 5 presents the full set of explanatory variables in our basic wage model which 
includes year and industry dummies.  Our sample encompasses manufacturing (except for the 
food, beverage and tobacco sector, excluded because of the concerns regarding non-tariff barriers 
and tariffs not being predetermined), and the electricity sector.  The coefficients on the worker 
characteristics are generally significant, with the exception of a dummy for employment in the 
private sector. The coefficients also have their expected signs.  Older workers tend to earn more.   13
Female workers with similar characteristics earn on average less than their male counterparts; 
married workers tend to earn more possibly due to marriage signaling stability; the returns to 
schooling also have their expected signs with significantly higher returns for a tertiary education.  
There are also wage premiums enjoyed by workers living in larger cities.    
Moving on to the variables of interest, the results suggest that industry tariffs are 
negatively correlated with workers’ hourly wages, controlling for an individual worker’s 
characteristics, geographic variables and employment in the private sector. Both the coefficient 
on tariffs vis-à-vis the European Union as well as the coefficient on tariffs vis-à-vis the world are 
negative and statistically significant at the five and the one percent level, respectively.  This 
finding indicates that workers in more liberalized sectors earn more controlling for all observable 
characteristics of the worker, the job and the industry.  This finding is robust to including year 
and industry fixed effects.  In this basic specification, a 10 percentage point decline in the 
industry tariff vis-à-vis the EU is associated with a 2.6 percent increase in wages of workers 
employed in the industry. For tariffs on imports from the world the corresponding increase in 
wages is 3.4 percent. 
Next, we add to the basic model controls for industry concentration, sectoral imports and 
exports to demonstrate that our results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In the 
top panel of Table 6, we present the results for the simple average of import tariffs in a given 
industry vis-à-vis the European Union.  In the bottom panel, we present results employing tariffs 
vis-à-vis the world. As the coefficients on worker characteristics remain very similar to those in 
the basic specification, this and the following tables will only present the effects of our variables 
of interest—tariffs and sector-specific characteristics.   The specification in column (1) includes 
the lagged value of Herfindahl index, which captures industry concentration, in addition to all 
variables present in the basic specification. Controlling for the industry concentration does not 
change our earlier conclusion that lower trade protection is associated with higher wages. In 
column (2), we include lagged Herfindahl index and lagged imports (expressed in logarithmic 
form).  In the top panel with tariffs on imports from the EU we employ figures pertaining to 
trade with the EU. Similarly, when tariffs vis-à-vis the world are used, trade figures pertain to 
trade with the world. As before, tariffs are negatively correlated with wages. In column (3), we 
include lagged exports (expressed in logarithmic form) in addition to the variables listed in the 
previous column.  As before, lower tariffs are associated with higher wages and the effect is   14
significant at the one percent level. As for other industry-specific variables, only lagged exports 
appear to be statistically significant.  The positive coefficient on exports suggests that export-
oriented industries offer a wage premium to workers employed there. 
To ensure that our tariff variables do not simply proxy for the increased ability of sectors 
to export, we conduct two checks. First, we calculate the correlation between the annual changes 
in industry tariffs vis-à-vis the EU (or the world) and the annual changes in exports to the EU (or 
the world).  The correlations are quite low -.02 (.12).  For imports, the corresponding figures are 
-.04 (.06).  Second, we estimate two additional specifications: one with contemporaneous 
imports and exports but without tariffs and another one with contemporaneous imports, exports 
and tariffs. If tariffs simply proxy for the sector’s ability to export, the tariff variable should lose 
its significance. This is not the case, though. While contemporaneous exports are positively 
correlated with industry wages, the coefficient on tariffs remains negative, similar in magnitude 
to the earlier regressions and statistically significant at the one percent level.  As before, industry 
imports do not appear to have a statistically significant effect on wages. 
To address the concern that there may be other sector-specific time-varying factors 
affecting wages, we experiment with additional controls, such as, capital accumulation, stock of 
foreign direct investment and the share of unskilled labor.  The first two variables are expressed 
in logarithms.  The last variable has been calculated based on the Labor Force Survey.  All three 
controls enter as first lags.  Additionally, in all specifications we include the lagged value of 
industry concentration. Results using tariffs vis-à-vis the European Union are presented in the 
top panel of Table 7 and those using tariffs vis-à-vis the world are in the bottom panel.  In 
column (1), controlling for capital accumulation and the industry concentration, we still find that 
lower tariffs are associated with higher wages.  Also, there is a mildly positive correlation 
between capital accumulation and wages.  In column (2), we control for industry’s concentration 
and FDI stock in the sector, and similarly we find a negative and significant relationship between 
tariffs and wages.  However, FDI stock does not appear to have any significant effect on wages. 
In column (3), we control for capital accumulation, foreign direct investment, industry’s 
concentration, and the share of unskilled labor.  The effect of tariff on wages is still significantly 
negative suggesting that workers in sectors with greater extent of liberalization benefit from 
higher wages, even after controlling for observable individual, sectoral, and geographical 
characteristics.    15
As a robustness check, we repeat the above analyses by allowing returns to schooling to 
change over time.  To do so, we combine our seven education categories into three groups: 
tertiary, secondary and primary or less, and interact each education group with year dummies. 
The results are very similar.   Table 8 presents the basic specification with additional controls 
such as capital accumulation, stock of foreign direct investment and the share of unskilled labor.  
Ceteris paribus, workers in more liberalized sectors receive higher wages.  
As another robustness check, not reported here, we re-estimate all the specifications 
correcting standard errors for clustering on industries, rather than industry-year combinations. 
Doing so does not change the conclusions of the paper.   
Finally, we exclude skilled workers (i.e., those with university education) from our 
sample and present the estimation results of the sub-sample of unskilled workers in Table 9 and 
Table 10.  The findings are very similar to those for the full sample in terms of the magnitudes of 
the impact from tariff reduction and the significance levels. The findings indicate that a reduction 
in the tariff is associated with wage increases for unskilled workers, after controlling for sector- 
and worker-specific characteristics.  Thus, reductions in trade barriers appear to have benefited 
the unskilled in terms of an increase in wages.   
In summary, our results suggest that lower trade protection in Poland has been associated 
with higher wages.  These findings are consistent with those of Gaston and Trefler (1994) based 
on cross-sectional data for the U.S.  Below we discuss four potential explanations for our results. 
The first potential explanation is that output mix has shifted toward the production of labor-
intensive goods, raising the return to labor relative to other factors of production.  Since trade 
protection was greatest prior to trade reform in labor-intensive sectors, this could explain why 
workers in the sectors which had a reduction in protection appear to experience higher wages. If 
this was the story, we would expect to see a shift in the pattern of production or employment 
toward labor-intensive industries.  The data presented in Tables 3 and A1 demonstrate, however, 
that this was not the case. 
The second potential explanation is that a reduction in tariffs has been associated with an 
increase in firms’ ability to export. However, as demonstrated earlier, there is hardly any 
correlation between annual changes in industry tariffs and industry exports. Moreover, as 
illustrated in Table 6, controlling for contemporaneous exports does not lead to a decline in the 
significance level or the magnitude of the estimated effect of tariffs.   16
The third possibility is that trade liberalization increases firm productivity and 
profitability through access to cheaper or better intermediate inputs.  While the high level of 
aggregation in our industry classification prevents us from testing this hypothesis explicitly, 
empirical support for this hypothesis has been presented by Fernandes (2003).  She finds that 
among Colombian plants that changed their imports, most plants that experienced productivity 
increases during the period of trade liberalization were also the ones that increased their reliance 
on imported inputs. 
The final possibility is that trade liberalization has led to increased competitive pressures 
in industries, thus forcing firms to restructure and improve their productivity.  This argument is 
in line with results of many firm-level studies, cited earlier, which find that trade liberalization 
leads to higher productivity.  This channel is even more plausible in the context of a transition 
economy, like Poland, where local firms were sheltered from any kind of competition until 1990.  
To provide further evidence on the plausibility of this channel, we use firm level data for the 
same period to demonstrate that trade liberalization led to a higher total factor productivity in 
Polish firms.  To make this exercise as comparable as possible to the industry premium results 
we use the same aggregation of industries and a comparable time period (1996-2000).  Full 





  In this study, we examine the relationship between changes in tariffs and wages during 
Poland’s trade liberalization in 1994-2001. Our results indicate that a worker’s wages are higher 
in industries with a larger reduction in trade protection, after controlling for the individual 
worker’s characteristics, such as age, education, gender, marital status, geographic variables and 
employment in the private sector.  Our findings are robust to controlling for industry-level 
exports and imports, degree of concentration, capital accumulation, FDI stock and the share of 
unskilled workers employed.  Moreover, they are not affected by controlling for unobserved but 
time-invariant industry characteristics.   
This result is consistent with the argument that reduction in trade protection brings about 
higher competition from imports, which can enhance worker productivity and industry 
performance.  The robust and significant relationship between a reduction in tariffs and an   17
increase in wages is also consistent with the stylized fact that there is much inefficiency in a 
planned economy; a sector that is exposed to greater foreign competition during the transition 
becomes more efficient and productive.  Another possible explanation is that trade liberalization 
improves access to cheaper or better intermediate inputs, which could enhance profitability.  
  In addition, we find that industries with larger reduction in tariffs are also those with 
higher shares of unskilled labor.  When we exclude skilled labor from our sample, the results still 
hold.  Thus, there is no evidence of trade liberalization leading to an erosion of wages of the 
unskilled or the so called “race to the bottom.”       18
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Figure 4.  Reduction in Poland’s import tariffs between 2001 and 1994 









































































































simple avg trade weighted avg
 







































































































simple avg trade weighted avg
 
Source: World Bank’s WITS database 
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                                                       Poverty Headcount (%)
Education of the hh head Hard poverty Medium poverty
Tertiary 0.57                     1.29                         
Secondary general 3.75                     6.96                         
Secondary vocational 12.16                   19.01                       
Primary 17.72                   26.76                       
TOTAL 9.60                     15.17                         26
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
    1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001   
real hourly wage (in PLN)    1.03 1.05 1.14 1.25 1.32 1.35 1.47  1.49   
     [.56]    [.57]   [.64]  [.74]   [.72]   [.79] [1.0]    [1.1]    
age    55.9 56.6 57.2 58.1 58.7 58.9 59.5  39.2   
           [9.6]    [9.6]   [9.57]  [9.5]   [9.3]   [9.2] [8.9]    [10.6]   
weekly hours worked     41.6 41.9 41.9 41.9 41.6 41.1 40.5  39.4   
            [7.8]    [7.6]   [7.4]   [7.3]   [7.3]    [6.9] [8.2]    [9.3]    
              
married     77% 77% 77% 78% 79% 80% 81%  74%   
female     45% 46% 46% 45% 46% 46% 46%  47%   
              
working in private sector    24% 27% 30% 34% 37% 38% 41%  49%   
current job is non-temporary    97% 97% 97% 97% 98% 97% 97%  88%   
              
Highest level attained  
(% by categories)  
 
         
 
primary or less    13.73 13.62 12.94 11.94 11.1  11.24 10.46 10.53   
general secondary    7.51 7.34 6.81 6.48 6.45 6.30 6.22  7.18   
basic vocational    35.62 35.30 35.37 35.96 35.66 34.94 34.92 35.15   
2-yr-college or  
secondary vocational 
 
30.93 31.41 31.68 32.37 32.67 32.83 32.07 32.28 
 
University    12.22 12.34 13.20 13.25 14.11 14.71 16.33 14.86   
 
Size of City  
(% by categories) 
 
         
 
100,000 or more people    33.28 32.03 31.4  30.16 29.16 29.04 27.72 28.73   
less than 100,000 people    35.78 37.19 38.66 38.96 38.11 38.41 40.14 38.54   
village     30.94 30.78 29.95 30.88 32.73 32.56 32.14 32.72   
              
Num of observations    15,509 15,798 15,056 14,623 14,312 12,594 9,206 10,650   
              
              
Notes:  
[..] denotes standard deviations.   The sample is restricted to those between 15-75 year-old, employees only.      27
Table 3. Distribution of employment by industries, 1994-2001 
      1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001     
Agriculture, fishery      0.044 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.029 0.024     
Mining      0.047 0.044 0.039 0.036 0.036 0.032 0.025 0.021     
Manufacturing of which               
Food, beverage, tobacco      0.053  0.054 0.055 0.053 0.052 0.054 0.051 0.052     
Textile     0.041  0.046  0.042  0.042 0.042 0.040 0.039 0.037     
Leather      0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006     
Wood      0.019 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.025     
Paper  products      0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.012     
Petroleum      0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003     
Chemical      0.014 0.013 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.012     
Rubber/plastic      0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.014     
Non-metallic     0.016  0.017  0.018 0.018 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.015     
Metal      0.038 0.040 0.039 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.034 0.034     
Machinery      0.027 0.028 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.017     
Electrical  appliances      0.014 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.017     
Transport  equipment      0.019 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.016 0.016     
Other  manufacturing      0.018 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.020     
Services  of which                
Utilities      0.025 0.028 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.027 0.026     
Construction      0.077 0.072 0.068 0.074 0.077 0.076 0.079 0.072     
Wholesale  and  retail  trade      0.094 0.101 0.101 0.100 0.108 0.109 0.108 0.134     
Hotels  and  restaurants      0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.020     
Transport, and 
communication      0.073 0.078 0.074 0.080 0.080 0.074 0.076 0.072     
Financial, real estate and 
business activities      0.045  0.051  0.057 0.052 0.055 0.062 0.058 0.064     
Public  administration      0.066 0.066 0.072 0.073 0.072 0.068 0.074 0.070     
Education, health and social 
work      0.188 0.183 0.194 0.194 0.192 0.207 0.209 0.185     
Other community, social 
and personal service 
activities      0.044 0.038 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.032     
                
All  sectors      1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000     
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Table 4. Share of unskilled labor (workers with primary or less schooling), by industries 
1994-2001 
      1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001    
Agriculture, fishery     0.335 0.357 0.346 0.309 0.336 0.323 0.313 0.283   
Mining     0.140 0.141 0.121 0.105 0.114 0.094 0.113 0.104   
Manufacturing of which                  
Food, beverage, tobacco      0.191  0.182 0.194 0.169 0.159 0.154 0.130 0.158   
Textile     0.166  0.138  0.147  0.143 0.129 0.129 0.161 0.108   
Leather     0.217 0.200 0.190 0.179 0.129 0.135 0.180 0.167   
Wood     0.218 0.204 0.223 0.174 0.156 0.230 0.211 0.199   
Paper  products     0.156 0.154 0.142 0.149 0.116 0.096 0.228 0.191   
Petroleum     0.183  0.197  0.137 0.128 0.146 0.125  ---  0.091   
Chemical     0.120 0.162 0.191 0.159 0.124 0.120 0.113 0.100   
Rubber/plastic     0.169 0.168 0.258 0.234 0.134 0.183 0.073 0.118   
Non-metallic     0.265  0.237  0.199 0.230 0.209 0.199 0.185 0.172   
Metal     0.162 0.152 0.150 0.132 0.120 0.132 0.096 0.101   
Machinery     0.101 0.107 0.076 0.059 0.060 0.086 0.074 0.052   
Electrical  appliances     0.135 0.127 0.108 0.081 0.090 0.125 0.114 0.103   
Transport  equipment     0.133 0.122 0.102 0.098 0.105 0.092 0.083 0.094   
Other  manufacturing     0.168 0.148 0.174 0.156 0.133 0.104 0.109 0.140   
Services  of which                 
Utilities     0.113  0.143  0.125  0.109 0.097 0.086 0.096 0.102   
Construction      0.163 0.171 0.153 0.167 0.151 0.153 0.153 0.149   
Wholesale  and  retail  trade;      0.088 0.090 0.092 0.075 0.083 0.078 0.068 0.080   
Hotels  and  restaurants      0.147 0.212 0.158 0.119 0.066 0.097 0.125 0.109   
Transport, and 
communication      0.140 0.147 0.135 0.123 0.117 0.122 0.102 0.105   
Financial, real estate and 
business activities     0.086  0.064  0.079 0.075 0.067 0.070 0.048 0.067   
Public  administration;      0.069 0.054 0.041 0.045 0.042 0.032 0.036 0.036   
Education, health and social 
work     0.106 0.108 0.105 0.100 0.091 0.091 0.079 0.075   
Other community, social 
and personal service 
activities     0.123 0.139 0.134 0.118 0.116 0.132 0.165 0.173   
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Table 5. Effects of trade protection on wages: A basic model, 1994-2001 
Dependent variable: log hourly real wage   [1]    [2]  
          
Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis EU    -.263**      
        
Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the world       -.341***   
          
Age   .0182***    .0182***   
age squared    -.000192***    -.000192***   
married dummy    .0674***    .0675***   
female dummy    -.146***       
dummy: employed in private sector    .00767    .00755   
          
Occupation: professionals    -0.224***    -0.224***   
Occupation: technicians    -0.252***   -0.253***   
Occupation: clerks    -0.360***   -0.360***   
Occupation: service workers    -0.422***   -0.422***   
Occupation: skilled agricultural workers    -0.469***   -0.469***   
Occupation: craft workers    -0.370***   -0.370***   
Occupation: plant and machine operators    -0.336***   -0.336***   
Occupation: elementary occupations    -0.473***   -0.473***   
          
city size [50K – 1million population]     -0.048***    -0.048***   
city [20-50K population]    -0.052***    -0.052***   
city [10-20K population]    -0.105***    -0.105***   
city [5-10K population]    -0.073***    -0.073**   
city [2-5K population]    -0.107***    -0.106***   
city (<2K population]    -0.159***    -0.160***   
village dummy    -0.095***    -0.095***   
          
dummy: 2 year college    -0.165***    -0.165***   
dummy: secondary technical    -0.253***    -0.253***   
dummy: secondary general educ    -0.261***    -0.261***   
dummy: vocational education    -0.308***    -0.308***   
dummy: primary educated    -0.360***    -0.360***   
dummy: less than primary    -0.440***    -0.440***   
          
Voivoidship dummies    yes    yes   
Year dummies    yes    yes   
Industry dummies    yes    yes   
          
No. of observations    27,531    27,531   
R-squared   .408    .408   
         
Notes:   * denotes significance at the 10-percent level;  ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level; and *** denotes significance at the 1-
percent level.  The sample is restricted to those between 15-75 year-old, employees only, in the manufacturing and electricity sectors.   
Omitted categories of dummies: city—population above one million, education—4- or 5-year college degree, occupation—managers.   30
Table 6. Effects of trade protection on wages with additional trade-related measures 
Dependent variable:   The Basic Model (specified in Table 5) plus additional control variables: 
log hourly real wage  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
        
-0.315*** -0.271*** -0.267***    -0.332***  Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the 
European Union  [.112] [0.114]  [0.109]    [0.0984] 
-0.0681 -0.103 -0.0897  -0.0741  -0.11  Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)  [0.0591] [0.0794] [0.0604] [0.0524]  [0.047] 
Lagged imports    0.0132  -0.00598     
   [0.0169]  [0.015]     
Lagged exports      0.0562***     
     [0.0141]     
Contemporaneous imports        -0.00178  -0.000962 
       [0.011]  [0.0113] 
Contemporaneous exports        0.0581***  0.0601*** 
       [0.014]  [0.0144] 
       
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations  24,213  24,213  24,213  24,598  24,598 
R-squared   .412         .413           .413         .41   .41  
          
        
Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the World -0.360***    -0.304***  -0.261***    -0.333*** 
  [0.0849] [0.109]  [0.103]    [0.0958] 
-0.0673 -0.0978 -0.0854 -0.0485  -0.101  Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)  [0.0553] [0.0876] [0.0605] [0.0555] [0.0567] 
Lagged imports
   0.0139  0.00364     
   [0.0187]  [0.0151]    
Lagged exports
     0.0515***    
     [0.015]    
Contemporaneous imports
      0.00931  -0.0171 
      [0.0241]  [0.0255] 
Contemporaneous exports
      0.0682***  0.0643*** 
      [0.0166]  [0.0169] 
       
Year dummies
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations  24,213  24,213  24,213  24,598  24,598 
R-squared .413  .413  .413  .41  .41 
          
Notes:   The Table only presents selected variables of interest.  All columns include the entire set of variables in the  basic 
model specified in Table 5 with additional control variables specified in respective columns.     
* denotes significance at the 10-percent level;  ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level; and *** denotes significance at the 1-
percent level.  The sample is restricted to those between 15-75 year-old, employees only, in the manufacturing and electricity sectors.    
[..] denotes robust standard errors.      31
Table 7. Effects of trade protection on wages with additional sector-specific variables 
(labor shares, capital accumulation, and foreign direct investment) 
 
        
Dependent variable:   The Basic Model (specified in Table 5) plus additional control variables: 
log hourly real wage    [1]  [2]  [3]   
          
        
 -0.233*  -0.604***  -0.666***    Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the 
European Union   [0.127]  [0.165]  [0.126]  
 -0.0523  -0.0088  -0.38*    Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)   [0.0495]  [0.108]  [0.207]   
Lagged capital accumulation     0.0275*    0.00259   
    [0.0145]   [0.00917]  
Lagged foreign direct investment      0.00726  -0.0212   
     [0.00818]  [0.0193]   
Lagged unskilled labor shares        0.674***   
       [0.227]  
       
Year  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of observations    24,598  12,697  10,580   
R-squared   .41  .421  .412   
          
        
 -0.294***  -0.534***  -0.55***   
Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the World 
  [0.103] [0.13] [0.107]   
 -0.0553  0.0121  -0.316    Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)   [0.0466]  [0.102]  [0.212]   
Lagged capital accumulation 
    0.0233   -0.00277  
    [0.0144]   [0.00946]  
Lagged foreign direct investment
     -0.000206  -0.0272   
     [0.00895]  [0.0215]   
Lagged unskilled labor shares
       0.636***  
       [0.23]  
       
Year  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of observations    24,598  12,697  10,580   
R-squared   .41  .421  .412   
          
Notes:   The Table only presents selected variables of interest.  All columns include the entire set of variables in the  basic 
model specified in Table 5 with additional control variables specified in respective columns.   
* denotes significance at the 10-percent level;  ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level; and *** denotes significance at the 1-
percent level.  The sample is restricted to those between 15-75 year-old, employees only, in the manufacturing and electricity sectors.    
[..]denotes robust standard errors.     32
Table 8. Effects of trade protection on wages allowing for time-varying returns to schooling 
 
        
Dependent variable:   The Basic Model (specified in Table 5) plus additional control variables: 
log hourly real wage    [1]  [2]  [3]   
          
        
 -0.247**  -0.619***  -0.682***    Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the 
European Union   [0.124]  [0.161]  [0.122]  
 -0.0526  0.00357  -0.377    Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)   [0.0489]  [0.108]  [0.204]   
Lagged capital accumulation     0.0282**   -0.0231   
   [0.0142]  [0.0187]  
Lagged foreign direct investment     0.00764  0.00263  
     [0.0081]  [0.00917]   
Lagged unskilled labor shares        0.631***  
       [0.226]  
       
Year  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of observations    24,598  12,697  10,580   
R-squared   .407    .417  .408   
          
     
Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the World   -0.296***  -0.546***  -0.564***  
   [0.103] [0.126] [0.104]   
 -0.0542  0.025  -0.311    Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)   [0.0461]  [0.101]  [0.209]   
Lagged capital accumulation 
   0.0244*  -0.0293  
   [0.0142]  [0.0209]  
Lagged foreign direct investment
     0.0000125  -0.00287   
     [0.00886]  [0.00941]   
Lagged unskilled labor shares
      0.591**   
       [0.229]  
       
Year  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of observations    24,598  12,697  10,580   
R-squared   .407    .417  .408   
          
Notes:   The Table only presents selected variables of interest.  All columns include the entire set of variables in the  basic 
model specified in Table 5 except that returns to schooling are now time-varying.   
* denotes significance at the 10-percent level;  ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level; and *** denotes significance at the 1-
percent level.  The sample is restricted to those between 15-75 year-old, employees only, in the manufacturing and electricity sectors.    
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Table 9. Sub-sample of unskilled workers:  Effects of trade protection and various trade 
measures on wages 
Dependent variable:   The Basic Model (specified in Table 5) plus additional control variables: 
log hourly real wage  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
        
-0.280*** -0.229**  -0.226**    -0.296***  Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the 
European Union  [0.105] [0.106] [0.101]    [0.0926] 
-0.0497 -0.0892 -0.0756 -0.0453 -0.0782  Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)  [0.0609] [0.08] [0.0597]  [0.0529]  [0.0482] 
Lagged imports    0.0159  -0.00298     
   [0.0161]  [0.0146]    
Lagged exports      0.0546***    
     [0.0145]     
Contemporaneous imports        0.00665  0.00676 
       [0.0103]  [0.0108] 
Contemporaneous exports        0.0525*** 0.0544*** 
       [0.0141]  [0.0143] 
       
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations  23,177 22,819 22,819 23,177 23,177 
R-squared  0.349 0.351 0.351 0.349 0.349 
          
        
Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the World -0.317***  -0.248**  -0.207**    -0.274*** 
  [0.0811] [0.103] [0.0986]    [0.0929] 
-0.0484 -0.0798 -0.0681 -0.0171 -0.0606  Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)  [0.0575] [0.0888] [0.0598] [0.0522] [0.0542] 
Lagged imports
   0.0182  0.00791     
   [0.0177]  [0.0147]    
Lagged exports
     0.0499***    
     [0.0155]    
Contemporaneous imports
      0.0227  0.000564 
      [0.0232]  [0.0247] 
Contemporaneous exports
      0.0547*** 0.0515*** 
      [0.0159]  [0.0162] 
       
Year dummies
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations  23,177 22,819 22,819 23,177 23,177 
R-squared  0.349 0.351 0.351 0.349 0.349 
          
Notes:   The Table only presents selected variables of interest.  All columns include the entire set of variables in the  basic 
model specified in Table 5 with additional control variables specified in respective columns.     
* denotes significance at the 10-percent level;  ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level; and *** denotes significance at the 1-
percent level.  The sample is restricted to those between 15-75 year-old, employees only, in the manufacturing and electricity sectors.    
[..] denotes robust standard errors.      34
Table 10. Sub-sample of unskilled workers:  Effects of trade protection and sector-
specific characteristics on wages  
 
        
Dependent variable:   The Basic Model (specified in Table 5) plus additional control variables: 
log hourly real wage    [1]  [2]  [3]   
          
        
 -0.194*  -0.523***  -0.589***    Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the 
European Union    [0.115] [0.15] [0.116]   
 -0.0326  0.0227  -0.256    Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)   [0.0491]  [0.102]  [0.206]   
Lagged capital accumulation     0.0296**    -0.0253   
   [0.0143]  [0.0183]  
Lagged foreign direct investment     0.00595  0.00242  
     [0.0075]  [0.00915]   
Lagged unskilled labor shares        0.530*   
       [0.267]  
       
Year  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of observations    23,177  12,039  10,023   
R-squared   0.349  0.365  0.354  
          
        
 -0.244**  -0.463***  -0.489***   
Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the World 
 [0.0946]  [0.119]  [0.0996]  
 -0.0349  0.0414  -0.198    Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)   [0.0466]  [0.0965]  [0.21]   
Lagged capital accumulation 
   0.0259*  -0.0306  
   [0.0143]  [0.0201]  
Lagged foreign direct investment
     -0.000568  -0.00239   
     [0.00841]  [0.0094]   
Lagged unskilled labor shares
      0.495*   
       [0.269]  
       
Year  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry  dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of observations    23,177  12,039  10,023   
R-squared   0.349  0.365  0.354  
          
Notes:   The Table only presents selected variables of interest.  All columns include the entire set of variables in the  basic 
model specified in Table 5 with additional control variables specified in respective columns.   
* denotes significance at the 10-percent level;  ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level; and *** denotes significance at the 1-
percent level.  The sample is restricted to those between 15-75 year-old, employees only, in the manufacturing and electricity sectors.    
[..]denotes robust standard errors.   
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Appendix I 
 















Agriculture,mining,fishery  31.39 28.87 33.05  4.6 44.15  20.49 
services sector  45.86 45.63 42.44 77.89 38.12  57.94 
manufacturing  22.75 25.5  24.51  17.51  17.73 21.57 
of which         
food, beverage, tobacco 17 10 20 13 23  18 
textile 7 5  11 1 3  4 
leather 2 2 2 1 3  2 
wood 11 10 10  6 12  12 
paper products 3 2 4  11 2  4 
petroleum 2 3 1 0 1  1 
chemical 5 7 4 8 4  3 
rubber/plastic 3 2 3 2 4  1 
non-metallic 6 6 6 6 9  3 
metal 16 21 15  9 10  8 
machinery 11 14  9  9  9  11 
electrical appliances 5 5 5  12 3  4 
transport equipment 8 5 4  10  12 19 
Other manufacturing 7 7 6  11 6  7 















Agriculture,mining,fishery  24.92 20.61 27.28  4.02 37.52  13.31 
services sector  51.98 54.52 48.12 76.84 44.39  60.92 
manufacturing  23.1 24.87  24.6 19.14 18.09  25.77 
of which         
food, beverage, tobacco 19 13 22 13 27  20 
textile 5 4 9 4 3  1 
leather 2 1 2 0 2  1 
wood 10 11  8  5 11  12 
paper products 4 3 5 9 3  6 
petroleum 1 2 1 1 1  1 
chemical 5 6 4 6 3  5 
rubber/plastic 4 4 5 6 6  3 
non-metallic 6 6 6 2 6  2 
metal 16 23 14 15 11  12 
machinery 9 12  8 12  9  7 
electrical appliances 5 5 4  12 3  4 
transport equipment 7 6 4 9 9 19 
Other manufacturing 7 4  10 7 6  7 
            
Source: Labor Force Surveys 





Association Agreement between the European 
Communities and the Republic of Poland  
 
Article 10 of the Europe Agreement signed in 1991 between Poland and the European 
Community stipulated the schedule of liberalization with respect to manufacturing products (HS 
Chapters 25-97).  This schedule did not cover HS Chapters 1 –24, which encompass 
agricultural products, processed foods, beverages and tobacco products.  The provisions of 
Article 10 were as follows:  
 
1.  Customs duties on imports applicable in Poland to products originating in the Community 
listed in Annex IVa shall be abolished on the date of entry into force of this Agreement. 
 
Annex IVa covered selected non-agricultural products from the following headings of the 
Harmonized System: 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 38, 40, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 68, 71, 
72, 74, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 97. 
 
2.  Customs duties on imports applicable in Poland to products originating in the Community 
which are listed in Annex IVb shall be progressively reduced as specified in that Annex. 
 
Annex IVb covered selected tariff lines pertaining to motor vehicles (HS8703, 8704, 8706 
and 8707).  It specified that customs duties on imports applicable in Poland to these products 
originating in the Community shall be eliminated according to the following schedule: 
-  on 1 January 1994 they will be reduced to six-seventh of the basic duty, 
-  on 1 January 1996 they will be reduced to five-seventh, 
-  on 1 January 1998 they will be reduced to four-seventh, 
-  on 1 January 1999 they will be reduced to three-seventh, 
-  on 1 January 2000 they will be reduced to two-seventh, 
-  on 1 January 2001 they will be reduced to one-seventh, 
-  on 1 January 2002 they will be reduced to zero, 
 
 
It also specified a suspension of customs duties within the limit of an annual preferential 
tariff quota for a certain number of cars starting from 1 January 1993. 
 
3.  Customs duties on imports applicable in Poland to products originating in the Community 
other than those listed in Annexes IVa and IVb shall be progressively reduced, and 
abolished by the end of the seventh year at the latest from the entry into force of this 
Agreement according to the following timetable: 
-  three years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement each duty shall be 
reduced to 80% of the basic duty, 
                                                 
3 The authors would like to thank Federica Saliola for preparing the information for this appendix.   37
-  four years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement each duty shall be 
reduced to 60% of the basic duty, 
-  five years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement each duty shall be 
reduced to 40% of the basic duty, 
-  six years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement each duty shall be 
reduced to 20% of the basic duty, 
-  seven years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement the remaining duties 
shall be eliminated. 
 
Provisions of the Europe Agreement with respect to agricultural products (HS Chapters 1 
to 24) were coved in Chapter II which specified that  
 
-  Customs duties on imports applicable in Poland to products originating in the 
Community listed in the annex XI shall be reduced on the date of entry into force of 
the Agreement by 10 percentage points.   
 
Annex XI pertained to selected products from HS Chapters: 01 Live Animals, 04 
Dairy Produce, Birds' Eggs, Natural Honey, Edible Products of Animal Origin, not 
Elsewhere Specified or Included, 06 Live Trees and Other Plants, Bulbs, Roots and 
the Like, cut Flowers and Ornamental Foliage, 07 Edible Vegetables and Certain 
Roots and Tubers, 08 Edible Fruit and Nuts, Peel of Citrus Fruits or Melons, 10 
Cereals, 12 Oil Seeds and Oleaginous Fruits, Miscellaneous Grains, Seeds and Fruit, 
Industrial or Medicinal Plants, Straw and Fodder 15 Animal or Vegetable Fats and 
Oils and Their Cleavage Products, Prepared Edible Fats, Animal or Vegetable Waxes, 
18 Cocoa and Cocoa Preparations, 19 Preparations of Cereals, Flour, Starch or Milk, 
Pastrycooks' Products, 20 Preparations of Vegetables, Fruit, Nuts or Other Parts of 
Plants, 22 Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar, 23 Residues and Waste From the Food 
Industries, Prepared Animal Fodder 
 
-  The Community and Poland shall grant each other the concessions referred to in 
Annexes Xa (imports of bovine animal), Xb (some products of chapters 01, 02 - Meat 
and Edible Meat Offal, 04 ), Xc (some products of chapters 07, 08, 20) and XI on a 
harmonious and reciprocal basis, in accordance with the conditions laid down therein. 
 
Annex Xa specified that “In case the number of animals fixed in the framework of the 
balance sheet arrangements foreseen in Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 are lower than a 
reference quantity, a global tariff quota equal to the difference between that 
reference quantity and the number of animals fixed under the balance sheet 
arrangements will be opened to imports from Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia.” 
 
-  Trade in agricultural goods was to remain subject to quantitative restrictions, which 
according to Article 20 were to be gradually abolished. 
 
Poland shall abolish at the latest by the end of the fifth year from the entry into force of the 
Agreement the quantitative restrictions on imports originating in the Community listed in Annex 
IX in accordance with the conditions established in that Annex. Annex IX covered: Beverages, 




Evidence of Trade Liberalization and Changes in 
Firm Productivity 
 
In order to shed some light on the channel through which trade liberalization may influence 
industry premiums, we examine the impact of tariff reductions on the productivity of Polish 
firms.  This exercise is based on an unbalanced panel dataset of 5,090 firms operating in Poland 
during the period 1996-2000.  The information comes from a commercial database Amadeus, 
compiled by Bureau van Dijk, which contains comprehensive information on companies 
operating in thirty-five European countries, including Poland.
4 
 
The analysis proceeds in two stages.  First, we estimate a production function separately for each 
sector to get measures of the total factor productivity (TFP):
5 
ln Yit =α + β1 ln Lit +  β2 ln Kit + β2 ln Mit + µt + εit 
where Yit represents sales of firm i in year t, deflated by the sectoral deflator taken from the 
Poland’s Statistical Yearbooks, Lit is the number of employees, Kit the value of fixed assets and 
Mit the value of materials used.  Kit and Mit are deflated by the GDP deflator.  The equation also 
contains year dummies. 
 
Then we relate the annual changes in TFP to the changes in industry import tariffs: 
∆ ln TFPijt = φ ∆ tariffjt + µj +  uit 
where TFPijt is the total factor productivity estimated in the first stage for firm i operating in 
sector j in year t and tariffjt is the tariff on imports of industry j’s products in year t. In addition to 
the 14 manufacturing sectors considered in the paper, we also experiment with including all 
sectors and setting tariffs on services sectors to zero. Estimating the equation in first differences 
allows us to eliminate unobserved time-invariant characteristics of industry j.  Since some 
industries may be experiencing faster TFP growth due to, for instance, faster technological 
progress we also include industry fixed effects in the estimation.  To take into account the fact 
that while the variable of interest (tariffs) is industry-specific, a firm is the unit of observation, 
we report robust standard errors corrected for clustering by industry.  To make the analysis as 
comparable as possible to the industry premium exercise, we employ exactly the same industry 
classification and use the same tariff figures (with the exception of the sample encompassing also 
services industries). 
 
The estimation results, presented below, give support to our hypothesis that trade liberalization is 
associated with higher productivity at the firm level.  We find a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on the tariff variable both in the sample encompassing all sectors as well 
as in the manufacturing subsample.  The results hold for both trade liberalization vis-à-vis the 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, the version of Amadeus to which we have access does not include the 2001 figures and is missing 
employment data from before 1996, which restricts our analysis to the 1996-2001 period. 
5 Due to a small number of observations we combine textiles and leather products into one sector when estimating 
the production function.  We also combine coke and petroleum manufacturing with chemicals.   39
European Union as well as for tariffs vis-à-vis the world.  The results are also robust to including 
in the regression a lagged measure of industry concentration (Hefindahl index). 
 
 
Table A2. Total factor productivity and trade liberalization: estimation on first 
differences  
 
           
Dependent variable:   All sectors    Manufacturing only   
Total factor productivity            
  
         
            
           
-2.073** -1.7611*    -2.0733* -2.0987*    Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the 
European Union  [0.989] [1.0075]    [1.0026] [0.9898]   
          
 -1.1178    0.0908   Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)   [0.7906]    [1.2733]  
            
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes    Yes Yes   
            
           
       
Simple Average Tariff vis-à-vis the World  -1.9361** -1.7026*    -1.8098** -1.7552**   
  [0.8329] [0.8448]    [0.8307] [0.8065]   
 -1.24    -0.2852   Lagged Herfindahl Index (i.e., concentration 
within an industry)   [0.7724]    [1.1204]  
           
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes    Yes Yes   
            
            
Notes:   The number of observations is equal to 6,039 in columns (1) and (2) and 2,420 in columns  (3) and (4).  The observations 
pertain  to the period 1996-2000.   
* denotes significance at the 10-percent level;  ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level; and *** denotes significance at the 1-
percent level. 
[..] denotes robust standard errors clustered by industry.      
 
 